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     This paper documents two key costs of AD protection.  First, once AD has been adopted
countries often have a difficult time restraining its use.  In recent years “new” users have accounted
for half of the overall world total.  Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even
have an AD statute a decade ago.   Second, I will show that on average AD duties cause the value
of imports to fall by 30-50%.  I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as those that
result in duties.  Interestingly, I also find that even for those cases that are rejected imports fall.  The
spread and impact of AD protection most surely implies that AD will continue to be a key negotiating
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Of all the issues negotiated under the Uruguay Round, antidumping was perhaps
the most contentious. Broadly stated, the debate pitted antidumping’s traditional
users, essentially industrialized countries such as the US and EC, against tradi-
tional non-users, primarily developing countries. Thanks to demands by the US
and EC the Uruguay Round achieved only mixed success at tightening the rules
governing antidumping (AD) actions. The strengthening of de minimis rules and
the addition of sunset reviews should make AD protection less burdensome for
small producers. Unfortunately the agreement also endorsed the cumulation pro-
vision, codiﬁed the concept of the AD duty as a cost, and did little to restrain the
use of price undertakings. All things considered, there is every reason to believe
not only that AD disputes will continue to ﬂourish but also that AD policy will
be a key item for the next WTOround.
To many observers, the US and EC’s embrace of AD is frustrating and per-
plexing. On the one hand, the US and EC preach that reducing government in-
terference and accepting free markets will maximize growth and welfare. On the
other hand, it often seems that just when developing countries begin to eﬃciently
operate and become competitive in particular markets, industrialized countries
shut down those precise markets with a trade policy that is universally decried
by economists. “Do as I say, not as I do” seems an apt description of the US and
EC’s view of the eﬃciency of government involvement in markets—at least with
respect to AD.
1A growing number of countries however, have not followed that advice. In
recent years “new” AD users (primarily developing countries) have initiated AD
complaints at unprecedented rates. Only a decade ago developing countries ﬁled
only one or two complaints per year. By contrast, in recent years developing
countries account for well over 100 petitions per year, close to half of the overall
world total. It appears, then, that developing countries have also been seduced by
AD’s unique combination of GATT/WTOconsistency and ease of use. Now they
too can levy sector speciﬁc tariﬀs without blatantly violating their tariﬀ bindings.
This surge of AD activity has not gone unnoticed. According to the US Trade
Representative, trade negotiations must preserve “antidumping laws as eﬀective
remedies against unfair trade practices” while at the same time “prevent misuse
of other countries’ antidumping laws against U.S. exporters.”1 In other words,
traditional AD users are worried that the “new” users are using AD to restrict
competition and close markets which earlier GATT rounds had opened. The desire
to reign in other countries’ use of AD may cause industrialized countries to change
their tune with respect to AD. Apparently, the US and EC may ﬁnally seek to
reform AD because other countries have also realized how large a loophole it is,
how easy it is to use, and perhaps most importantly, how easy it is to misuse.
AD has become the trade policy of choice for both developed and developing
economies. Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly why so many new countries are
embracing AD law. Perhaps they believe that if it is good for the US and the EC
1Letter from U.S. Trade Representative Michael Kantor to Senator Ernest Hollings, 29 June
1993, reprinted inside “Inside U.S. Trade,”2 July 1993, page 15.
2then it must be good for them too. Perhaps they believe that their use of AD is
the only way to defend themselves against other countries using it against them.
Or, perhaps AD is simply a policy instrument that their mercantilist instincts
can’t resist.
Whatever the motivation, it is unlikely that many new AD users are aware
of the costs of embracing such a policy. The goal of this paper is to begin the
process of educating AD users as to the costs of its use. I will present evidence
that shows that countries should be very careful in embracing AD protection.
While current proliferation of AD actions might lead to long run restrictions on
antidumping, I argue that one should not overlook the short run costs associated
with AD protection.
I will emphasize two main costs of AD protection. First, there is substantial
evidence that once AD has been adopted, countries often have a diﬃcult time re-
straining its use. Many of the reasons why AD is so attractive to policymakers—it
is an extremely ﬂexibility and timely instrument—are also reasons why it is prone
to being misused. AD can be applied in so many circumstances because its rules
and procedures can be broadly interpreted. A country may ﬁnd it advantageous
to interpret the GATT/WTOstandards in such a way that a particular sector can
be protected. Yet, this almost always leads other sectors too also seek protection
under this newly established precedent. Thus, it is diﬃcult for governments to
reign in its use. Industries like AD since it allows them to seek protection—often
with only the skimpiest evidence of injury and little evidence of economically un-
justiﬁed pricing practices. As a result, countries adopting an AD statute often ﬁnd
3it a bit like letting the genie out of the bottle—it is diﬃcult to give one industry
protection without encouraging other sectors to also seek protection. So while it
might be conceivable that AD protection raises welfare in certain circumstances,
its widespread use suggests that it is often being used inappropriately.
Second, unlike typical MFN tariﬀs AD duties are almost always remarkably
large. On average, AD duties are 10 to 20 times higher than the MFN level, and
it not unheard of to have AD duties more than 100 times higher than the MFN
level. Clearly, protection at these levels has dramatic impact on trade. I will
provide evidence that that on average AD duties cause the value of imports to
fall by 30–50%. I will also show that AD actions distort trade patterns even if
duties are never levied. Almost one-quarter of all AD cases are settled, often via
some form of VER or marketing arrangement. I ﬁnd that trade falls by almost
as much for these cases as those that result in duties. Interestingly, I also ﬁnd
that even for those cases that are rejected imports fall, evidence that the mere
investigation distorts trade. All things considered, policymakers would be well
advised to consider the large distortions created by AD actions before they rush
to embrace it.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I will begin by reviewing
recent trends in AD activity (section 2). I will document the the rise of AD activity
over the past decade and show that the continued growth in AD activity is largely
being fueled by countries who have only recently adopted the statute. It is this
spread in AD activity that keeps AD reform a top item on the WTOagenda.
In the second part of the paper I estimate the trade impact of AD law (section
43). Here I will rely on data from the world’s heaviest antidumping user—the
United States—as it is the only country where comprehensive data are available
to conduct such a study. Given that most AD adopters have used the US statute
as a guide for implementing their own AD statute, the lessons learned from the
US experience are likely to carry over to others. Using extremely disaggregated
trade data, I ﬁnd that AD actions have a very large eﬀect on imports. When
an AD dispute results in duties or is settled, I estimate that on average import
quantities fall by almost 70 percent and import prices rise by more than 30 percent.
Interestingly, even when an AD dispute is ultimately rejected, the scrutiny has a
signiﬁcant impact on trade. The data reveal that AD investigations—regardless
of their outcome—harass importers. I ﬁnd that even when the case is rejected
imports fall by about 20 percent.
2. The Spread of Antidumping
Until relatively recently AD actions were not not particularly common. For in-
stance, in the 1960s all GATT members ﬁled only about ten antidumping petitions
per year (Schott, 1994). During the 1970s, however, a small set of users began
to more actively initiate AD actions, primarily as a way to protect declining in-
dustries. Even as recently as the late-1980s AD law was essentially only enforced
by ﬁve territories—Canada, New Zealand, Australia, United States and the Euro-
pean Community. Over the decades of the 1980s, more than 1600 AD cases were
ﬁled worldwide (Finger, 1993). As a group, the “traditional” users accounted for
5more than 95% of all AD cases during the 1980s.2
Demand for AD protection has continued to grow during the 1990s. Over
the past ten years, almost 2200 AD cases have been ﬁled worldwide, a ﬁling rate
about 25% greater than during the 1980s (see Table 1). While the overall usage
has increased, the most noticeable trend is the change in who is using the law.
The once exclusive club has now opened its doors. Countries of all stages of
development and industrialization have joined the ranks of active AD users. And,
it is the dozens of new users that have fueled AD’s continued growth.
Over the 1987–1997 period 29 countries initiated antidumping complaints,
about triple the number during the prior ten years. Over the past ten years there
has been a ﬁve-fold increase in AD ﬁlings by “new” users.3 More impressively, as
compared with the early 1980s, there has been a ﬁfty-fold increase.
New users are not only ﬁling more cases than they had previously, but they are
also accounting for an increasing share of total complaints. Between 1987–1992
new users ﬁled about 20% of the AD cases in each year. By contrast, over the
last ﬁve years new users account for well over half of AD complaints. The trend
is even more striking in comparison with trends during the 1980s, when new users
accounted for fewer than 5% of AD cases.
It is also striking how quickly AD is embraced once legislation is enacted.
Mexico, for instance, signed the GATT/WTOantidumping code in 1987 and ﬁled
more than 30 cases within three years. Argentina ﬁled its ﬁrst AD case in 1991 and
2This same group similarly dominated AD activity during the 1960s and 1970s.
3By the term “new”users I refer to all countries other than the ﬁve traditional users of AD.
6has since averaged almost 20 cases per year. Likewise, South Africa has initiated
more than 20 cases per year since it adopted an AD statute. Similar patterns of
use—a rush to invoke the new law—are evidenced by India, Indonesia, Turkey,
Malaysia, Peru, Israel, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The evidence is
overwhelming that AD is not a statute which grows dusty from disuse.
The widespread adoption of AD law has also impacted which countries are
targeted. In Table 2 I detail AD actions by targeted country. Several interesting
trends are evidenced. First, note that over the entire period almost 99 countries
were investigated—about twice as many as were investigated during the 1980s.
Apparently, AD’s expanding reach can be measured equally well by either the
number of active users or the number of investigated countries.
Second, note that during the 1980s almost all dumping charges were made
by a small number of countries and most targeted a very small set of countries.
In particular, during the 1980s two-thirds of AD investigations targeted another
traditional user (Finger, 1993). By comparison, over the past decade only about
one-third of the cases targeted a traditional AD user. In this sense, AD’s reach
has expanded.
In another sense, however, the targets of AD investigations are much the same
as they were during the 1980s. Note that during the 1980s two-thirds of AD
investigations involved countries who were fellow AD users. Interesting, during
the 1990s virtually the same percent of AD cases (1498 of 2196) were ﬁled against
fellow AD users. In other words, AD is still a policy largely wielded within the
club of AD users; the big diﬀerence is that now the club is bigger than it was
7before.
These trends are consistent with Finger’s (1993) conjecture that many coun-
tries adopt AD, at least in part, to counter the sanctioning of their imports. That
is, countries adopt AD not only to protect against unfair imports, but also to
defend their exporters against abuse of the law abroad. From this view, AD is a
part of a tit-for-tat strategy. In this case, many AD actions are not motivated by
a desire to make markets more competitive but rather by a wish to deter other
countries’ from using the law. In other words, by raising the cost of exporting a
government hopes to raise the costs of others using the law.
On the other hand, the trends are also consistent with the view that AD users
are primarily the same countries who are subject to AD actions. Perhaps the
notion that adopting AD law will deter others from using is incorrect. Rather,
it appears that AD activity is better understood as an example of prisoner’s
dilemma. Each country cannot resist the temptation to protection to important
import-competing industries. Yet, if all countries also use AD law, each country
is worse-oﬀ than they would be under free trade. Under this interpretation, all
users would beneﬁt if everyone agreed to stop using the law.
3. Impact of Antidumping
The ﬁling trends presented indicate that the AD genie is out of the bottle. A
multitude of countries have only recently enacted AD statutes and these new
users are now ﬁling a larger and larger number of cases. What do these ﬁlings
8mean for the markets aﬀected? Under the best case scenario I could estimate the
impact of AD for each country and sector that has used the law. Unfortunately,
the data are not available to perform such an exercise. Instead, I will estimate
the eﬀect of AD actions using data from the largest AD user, the United States.
For a couple of reasons the US is an excellent candidate for understanding
the eﬀects of AD protection. First of all, the US has ﬁled more AD cases than
any other user. Therefore, we have a large sample of cases. US industries ﬁled
over 700 AD petitions between 1980 and 1994. About a quarter of the cases were
settled; of the remaining cases, about half were rejected and half resulted in duties.
Second, as the world’s most prominent AD user, the US statute has served as the
basis for many countries newly adopting AD law. The GATT AD rules are quite
broad and countries have signiﬁcant latitude in implementing their AD statute,
but most have chosen to follow US procedures. Thus, even though the estimates
are based on US data, they should reasonably approximate what we can expect
for countries with similar AD statutes. Third, the quality of US trade data is
excellent. Machine-readable import statistics are available for the entire period
and the data is reported at the line-item level.
Several important characteristics of AD protection should be highlighted before
we proceed with our estimates. First, AD investigations involve two questions:
(1) was their “unfair pricing” (i.e., price discrimination or below-cost sales) and
(2) did the dumped imports cause injury. The former question is almost always
answered in the aﬃrmative. Since 1980 fewer than 5% of AD cases were rejected
9because the domestic industry could not show unfair pricing.4
In fact, the estimated margins (a metric of the extent of unfair pricing) av-
eraged about 40%. The median duty levied was 16%. To put these margins
in perspective, note that the industries seeking AD protection had MFN tariﬀ
levels averaging about 4%. Many cases were subject to seemingly prohibitive lev-
els of protection; for example, twenty percent of the cases had duties exceeding
50%; ten percent of the cases had duties exceeding 100%. Given the size of the
dumping margins, one would expect that the typical AD user receives substantial
protection.
The second question—existence of injury—is where dumping cases tend to be
rejected. At this stage the US International Trade Commission (ITC) must decide
if the dumping imports have caused, or threaten to cause, material injury to the
domestic industry. Over the sample period, about half of the ITC’s ﬁnal injury
determinations were negative.5
Perhaps the most overlooked feature of AD is that its protection is country-
speciﬁc. AD duties are levied only on imports from countries named in the peti-
tion. It would be unusual for a petition to name all import suppliers. Rather a
case usually only names a subset of import competitors. In our empirical analysis,
therefore, it will be important to distinguish between countries named in the peti-
tion and those not named. For example, if the steel industry alleges that 1/4 inch
4The rules governing how the Department of Commerce calculates dumping margins are
widely considered biased in favor of ﬁnding positive margins. See Boltuck and Litan (1991) and
Lindsey (1999) for discussions.
5Hansen and Prusa (1996, 1997) analyze ITC decision-making.
10ball-bearings are being dumped from Canada and Brazil, only ball-bearings from
those two named countries are subject to duties. If Canadian suppliers have 10%
of the import market and Brazilian suppliers 15%, the petition would cover 25%
of the rival imports. The other countries supplying 1/4 inch ball-bearings would
not be investigated nor subject to duties. Once Canada and Brazil are sanctioned,
demand for domestically produced ball-bearings should increase. Demand should
also increase for similar ball-bearings produced by other foreign countries. For
instance, Argentina should be able to sell more to the US market and/or raise its
price on ball-bearings exports destined for the US market. On average, a typical
case names about 40% of the total import market.
Therefore, AD actions have the potential to provide substantial protection and
also induce trade diversion. In order to quantify the eﬀect of the petition on trade
from named and non-named I estimate a model of the form
yit = δyi,t−1 + x
 
itβ + uit,t = −3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3( 1 )
where δ is a scalar, x 
it is 1 × K and β is K × 1. I assume that the uit follow a
one-way error component model
uit = µi + νit, (2)
where µi ∼ IID(0,σ 2
µ)a n dνit ∼ IID(0,σ 2
ν) independent of each other. µi denotes
11the individual speciﬁc residual, diﬀering across cases but constant for a given case.
For instance, a country with comparative advantage in ball bearings is likely to
have large imports year after year, and hence have a large µi. Time is normalized
so that t = 0 denotes the year the petition was ﬁled; hence, t = −1 refers to the
year prior to the ﬁling, t = +1 refers to the year following the ﬁling, t = +2 refers
to the second year following the ﬁling, etc. Thus, the cross-section is identiﬁed by
the cases and the time series variation is driven by annual observations on import
trade before and after the AD petition.
The ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estimator is a standard way of estimating (1) since it
eliminates µi. However, in our application the FE estimator will be biased and
potentially inconsistent since yi,t−1 will be correlated with the FE-transformed
residual. The extent of the inconsistency varies from application to application,
but in general the problem will be less serious the longer is the time series (Kiviet
1995). Given the relatively short length of the time series (seven years) it is
necessary to account for this potential problem.
To resolve the problem we take ﬁrst diﬀerences of (1), yielding




i,t−1)β +( νit − νi,t−1),
thereby eliminating µi.W ec a nr e w r i t et h i se q u a t i o na s
∆yit = δ∆yi,t−1 +∆ x
 
itβ +  it. (3)
12By construction, yi,t−1 will be correlated with the transformed residual νit −
νi,t−1 so we need to estimate the transformed equation with instrumental variables
(IV). There are a multitude of moment conditions that can be exploited to derive
instruments. For all time periods both yi,t−2 and lagged values of x 
it are valid
instruments. For time periods t =0 ,1,2,3 we can use additional lags of yi,t;
for instance, for period t =0yi,t−3 can be used as an additional instrument.
Additional lags can be added for each forward period.6
In the tables presented below, I report estimates for both the FE estimates of
(1) and IV estimates of (3). The FE estimates are a useful benchmark and the
results for the two estimations procedures do not greatly diﬀer, suggesting the
ﬁxed eﬀect bias is small in this application.
Public sources were used to collect the data. The International Trade Com-
mission’s Annual Report provides basic case information such as year of ﬁling,
outcome, etc. Each AD petition also contains information about the industry ﬁl-
ing the petition, the country being investigated, the products allegedly dumped,
etc. The products are identiﬁed by the line-item tariﬀ codes upon which the duty
will be levied. Using these codes I gathered product level data using import data
from Feenstra (1996). Since most cases identify more than one line-item, I sum
across all named tariﬀ lines to construct trade for the named products (by coun-
try) for each year. Thus, for each case I construct import data for each country
(only a subset of which are named).
6See Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995) for a more complete discussion of the estimation of
dynamic panel models and the construction of valid instruments.
13We now need to determine what metric of imports should be studied. AD
actions can distort import trade in a variety of ways. For instance, the foreign
ﬁrms may simply pass through the AD duty. In this case an action would likely
lower import quantities but have little impact on import prices. On the other
hand, the named foreign ﬁrms may raise their prices. Doing so increases the
chance that the AD duty will be removed but means that consumers will face
sharply higher import prices. In this sense AD’s impact can be felt via either
higher prices, lower quantities, or both. To try and shed light on the various ways
AD can distort trade I estimate the eﬀect of AD actions on the value of imports,
the quantity of imports, and the price (unit value) of imports.
How might an AD investigation aﬀect trade? To get a direct measure of the
impact of AD duties, I report a speciﬁcation with the (log) AD duty in each of
t h et h r e ey e a r sf o l l o w i n gt h ec a s e( t =1 ,2,3). Recall, however, that the AD duty
is only imposed when the case receives an aﬃrmative ﬁnal injury determination.
This direct measure, then, does not pick up any potential trade restraint when
the case is settled or rejected.
It is often argued that AD petitions have a profound impact on imports even
if they do not result in duties (Staiger and Wolak, 1989; Prusa, 1992). Consider
ﬁrst that about 20% of US AD cases were settled, and the large majority of these
cases were resolved with some type of voluntary restraint agreement. Hence, we
would expect that these settled outcomes to have a measurable impact on trade.
Note, however, that these agreements usually involve explicit quantity restrictions
but often do not mandate speciﬁc price increases. Thus, settled cases might have
14a substantial impact on quantities but not prices.
There is also evidence that imports are signiﬁcantly restrained when the case
is rejected. For example, Staiger and Wolak (1994) ﬁnd that imports fall dramat-
ically during the investigation period, regardless of the case’s ultimate outcome.7
Legal scholars often refer to this as the “harassment” eﬀect of an AD investigation.
Therefore, all three outcomes—aﬃrmative decisions (duties levied), settled, and
negative decisions—can have signiﬁcant impact on imports. In order to quantify
the importance of these eﬀects I also report a speciﬁcation where dummy variables
capture the aﬀect of the case’s outcome at time t =1 ,2,3.
Finally, in all speciﬁcations I include (but do not report) year dummies for
each regressions. Year dummies capture macroeconomic shocks that are common
across all cases but vary over time. For instance, the dollar depreciation in 1985
might aﬀect the domestic price of all 1985 imports.8
Named Countries
In Table 3 I report results for the value of imports. The ﬁrst (last) four columns
report estimates for the named (non-named) countries.9 According to the FE
estimates, the imposition of AD duties signiﬁcantly restrain trade in each of the
ﬁrst three years following the case.10 Speciﬁcally, a 10% duty causes imports
7Staiger and Wolak’s (1994) regressions focus on trade during the ﬁrst year following the
ﬁling of the petition and are therefore best interpreted as estimates of the short run eﬀect of
AD investigations. In contrast, the regressions below are best interpreted as longer run eﬀects.
8Full parameter estimates are available from the author upon request.
9To keep the table manageable, I abuse notation by denoting the IV parameter estimates
without ∆.
10Using the Davidson-MacKinnon (1981) test I cannot reject the log-log speciﬁcation in favor
15from named countries to fall by about 1.9% during the ﬁrst year following the
AD investigation. The impact is smaller in subsequent years, but still signiﬁcant.
According to the IV estimates, the impact during the ﬁrst year is somewhat larger
than the FE estimates, but the impact in the second and third year is no longer
signiﬁcant.
Given the discussion in Prusa (1997) the estimated elasticities are somewhat
smaller than expected. There are several possible explanations. First, as men-
tioned above the foreign ﬁrms may raise their price to the US market. By doing
so the foreign ﬁrms increase the chance that the duties will be removed in a more
timely fashion. Doing so also means that they earn the higher per unit revenue
rather than allowing the duty to be collected by the US government.11 Second,
AD duties vary dramatically from case to case. Although the average duty (in af-
ﬁrmative cases) is 45%, the median duty (in aﬃrmative cases) is 26%, suggesting
that there are cases with rather large duties. Reviewing the data indicates that
there were a handful of exceptionally large duty cases—eleven cases had margin
exceeding 200%. Ten percent of the cases had duties exceeding 100%. Such wide
disparity is duties might make the constant elasticity speciﬁcation inappropriate.
For these reasons from this point on I will primarily emphasize the results from
the dummy variable speciﬁcation. Note that unlike the ln(duty) speciﬁcation, the
parameter estimates for the outcome dummies must be transformed before they
can be readily interpreted. At the bottom of the table I report the economic eﬀect
of estimating in levels.
11See Blonigen et. al. (1997) for a good discussion of this issue.
16of the respective case outcomes. According to both the FE and IV estimates, an
aﬃrmative AD determination reduces the value of imports by about 50% in each
of the three years following the determination. The value of imports falls by about
60% following a settlement agreement. Trade also falls in rejected cases by about
20%, although the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant for the IV estimates.
In Tables 4 and 5 I report analogous results for import quantities and prices,
respectively. Comparing the tables it becomes clear that AD has a larger impact
on quantities than on prices. In particular looking at the IV dummy results,
an aﬃrmative AD determination causes quantities to fall by almost 70% during
the ﬁrst three years following the duty. Prices increase by about half as much.
Interestingly, the parameter estimates conﬁrm our conjecture that settled cases
will primarily entail large restrictions in import quantities but relatively small
(and statistically insigniﬁcant) price increases. In particular, imported quantities
fall about the same when cases are settled or result in duties. However, prices
increase far less for settled cases than for aﬃrmative cases. These results are
consistent with the view AD law essentially serves as a GATT-consistent tool to
manage trade. The logic is that industries can inﬂuence when their dispute will be
settled (Prusa, 1991). For instance, certain industries seem especially proﬁcient at
creating political pressure, forcing the government to negotiate a voluntary export
restraint. Given this, it appears that industries who opt to settle are primarily
interested in managing their import competition rather than a desire to have
import prices reﬂect “fair” pricing.
17Non-named Countries
An AD case should also aﬀect imports from non-named countries. Interest-
ingly, while the FE and IV estimates gave quite similar results for imports from
named countries, the two procedures give signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results when we
analyze imports from non-named countries. As a result, the discussion will con-
centrate on the IV estimates since they have better theoretical grounding in this
application.
Looking ﬁrst the eﬀect on the value of imports (Table 3) we see that the dummy
variable speciﬁcation is not well estimated. However, the ln(duty) speciﬁcation
does ﬁnd that non-named countries respond to the reduction in trade by named
countries by increasing their sales to the US market. This is precisely the eﬀect we
expect. The IV elasticity estimates imply that a 10% AD duty raises non-named
imports by 6% during the ﬁrst year, implying that non-named countries oﬀset
about one-third of the fall from named countries.12 The IV dummy variable spec-
iﬁcation also ﬁnds that an aﬃrmative determination leads to steadily increasing
imports by non-named supplies: imports increase by 16% in year 1, 31% in year 2,
and 45% in year 3, but the estimated coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Turning next to the price and quantity eﬀects, just as we found for the named
countries, we ﬁnd that the AD has a far greater eﬀect on import quantities not
prices. For the price equations, none of the estimated parameters are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. By contrast, the many of parameters in the quantity equation
are signiﬁcant. For instance, the dummies controlling for an aﬃrmative AD de-
12On average non-named suppliers have 60% of the import market.
18termination are not only signiﬁcant but also large and positive, implying that
non-named suppliers respond to the aﬃrmative duty on named countries by sub-
stantially increasing their sales.
4. Concluding comments
In this paper I have documented the spread of AD protection and presented
estimates of the trade impact of such protection. Over the past decade the number
of countries using AD has dramatically increased. It is now the case that new users
more actively pursue AD investigations than traditional users such as the US and
EC. In addition, the data suggest that such investigations have a signiﬁcant impact
on import trade, regardless of whether duties are oﬃcially levied. Speciﬁcally,
settled cases are about as restrictive as cases that result in duties. In either event
the value of imports from named countries falls by 50–70 percent over the ﬁrst
three years of protection. And, even if the case is rejected I ﬁnd that imports fall
by 15–20 percent.
Given both the large number of AD users and also the huge impact AD duties
have on trade, antidumping will surely remain a top issue for the next WTO
round. The central issue, of course, is whether the next round will tighten the
rules governing AD protection. The estimates presented in this paper should be
a sobering reminder to negotiators of the distortions created by AD actions.
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Table 1















United States 15 40 24 34 63 83 32 48 14 22 16 391
Australia 22 16 21 47 68 71 59 15 5 17 42 383
European Community 28 27 18 48 29 42 21 43 33 25 41 355
Canada 31 15 13 15 11 46 25 2 11 5 14 188
New Zealand 0 9 1 1 9 14 0 6 10 4 5 59
TOTAL 96 107 77 145 180 256 137 114 73 73 118 1376
New users
Mexico 18 11 7 11 9 26 70 22 4 4 6 188
Argentina 0 0 0 0 1 14 27 17 27 22 15 123
Brazil 0 1 1 2 7 9 34 9 5 18 11 97
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 16 33 23 88
Others 6 5 11 7 31 21 31 50 31 71 60 324
TOTAL 24 17 19 20 48 70 162 114 83 148 115 820
Overall Total 120 124 96 165 228 326 299 228 156 221 233 2196
% by Traditional Users 80.0% 86.3% 80.2% 87.9% 78.9% 78.5% 45.8% 50.0% 46.8% 33.0% 50.6% 62.7%
% by OECD Countries 95.8% 95.2% 96.9% 98.8% 84.6% 89.6% 72.2% 61.8% 51.9% 40.7% 59.7% 74.7%
Source: Author's compilation based on data reported by Miranda, et. al. (1998).Targeted country
Table 2















United States 18 10 8 18 16 26 30 14 12 21 15 188
Australia 0 2 0 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 1 9
European Community 27 23 13 24 68 70 53 31 30 37 57 433
Canada 3 5 1 1 5 8 5 1 2 1 3 35
New Zealand 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 50 40 22 43 90 107 92 46 46 59 76 671
Other Leading Targets
China-PR 1 5 4 12 16 31 45 39 20 43 31 247
Korea 8 12 6 11 12 25 17 8 14 10 16 139
Japan 19 18 10 13 18 14 11 7 5 6 12 133
Brazil 5 6 7 7 7 18 23 9 8 10 5 105
China - Taiwan 6 8 6 11 10 15 11 5 4 8 16 100
Others 31 35 41 68 75 116 100 114 59 85 77 801
TOTAL 70 84 74 122 138 219 207 182 110 162 157 1525
Overall Total 120 124 96 165 228 326 299 228 156 221 233 2196
41.7% 32.3% 22.9% 26.1% 39.5% 32.8% 30.8% 20.2% 29.5% 26.7% 32.6% 30.6%
67.5% 56.5% 42.7% 42.4% 53.9% 47.5% 40.5% 28.1% 43.6% 35.7% 45.5% 44.5%
Source: Author's compilation based on data reported by Miranda, et. al. (1998).
% Against Traditional Users
% Against OECD CountriesTable 3
Impact of AD Actions on Value of Imports
Named Non-Named
ln Imports (FE) ln Imports (FE) ln Imports (IV) ln Imports (IV) ln Imports (FE) ln Imports (FE) ln Imports (IV) ln Imports (IV)
ln Imports, t-1 0.255 0.255 0.386 0.404 0.128 0.136 0.108 0.108
(0.017)** (0.017)** (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.014)** (0.016)** (0.022)** (0.023)**
ln Duty, year+1 -0.190 -0.244 0.107 0.065
(0.037)** (0.045)** (0.029)** (0.028)*
ln Duty, year+2 -0.155 0.061 0.146 0.041
(0.043)** (0.052) (0.033)** (0.029)
ln Duty, year+3 -0.124 -0.005 0.183 0.038
(0.051)* (0.058) (0.037)** (0.032)
Aff Dec, year+1 -0.788 -0.888 0.352 0.155
(0.138)** (0.156)** (0.126)** (0.106)
Aff Dec, year+2 -0.651 -0.656 0.495 0.285
(0.164)** (0.246)** (0.153)** (0.166)
Aff Dec, year+3 -0.687 -0.755 0.631 0.398
(0.199)** (0.333)* (0.184)** (0.224)
Neg Dec, year+1 -0.404 -0.295 0.148 0.009
(0.139)** (0.159) (0.129) (0.110)
Neg Dec, year+2 -0.339 -0.134 0.205 0.024
(0.162)* (0.245) (0.156) (0.172)
Neg Dec, year+3 -0.348 -0.126 0.321 0.163
(0.195) (0.329) (0.188) (0.231)
Settled, year+1 -0.560 -0.966 0.241 0.071
(0.190)** (0.231)** (0.172) (0.154)
Settled, year+2 -0.475 -0.835 0.308 0.106
(0.210)* (0.333)* (0.196) (0.230)
Settled, year+3 -0.893 -1.438 -0.023 -0.219
(0.249)** (0.439)** (0.223) (0.298)
Observations 3591 3591 2883 2883 1723 1723 1401 1401
R-squared 0.75 0.75 --- --- 0.85 0.85 --- ---
%∆  in dependent variable per unit change in
Aff Dec, year+1 -54.95% -59.36% 41.00% 16.07%
Aff Dec, year+2 -48.53% -49.65% 62.10% 31.16%
Aff Dec, year+3 -50.66% -55.53% 84.84% 45.11%
Neg Dec, year+1 -33.87% -26.51% 14.96% 0.34%
Neg Dec, year+2 -29.67% -15.13% 21.31% 0.89%
Neg Dec, year+3 -30.70% -16.45% 35.38% 14.62%
Settled, year+1 -43.93% -62.93% 25.39% 6.14%
Settled, year+2 -39.14% -58.96% 33.54% 8.32%
Settled, year+3 -60.29% -78.44% -4.68% -23.19%
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year dummies not reported
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% levelTable 4
Impact of AD Actions on Quantity of Imports
Named Non-Named
ln Quantity (FE) ln Quantity (FE) ln Quantity (IV) ln Quantity (IV) ln Quantity (FE) ln Quantity (FE) ln Quantity (IV) ln Quantity (IV)
ln Quantity, t-1 0.134 0.136 0.251 0.250 0.120 0.133 0.201 0.192
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.061)** (0.061)** (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.040)** (0.041)**
ln Duty, year+1 -0.271 -0.294 0.128 0.122
(0.048)** (0.057)** (0.036)** (0.038)**
ln Duty, year+2 -0.237 0.065 0.182 0.041
(0.056)** (0.067) (0.041)** (0.040)
ln Duty, year+3 -0.195 -0.003 0.240 0.053
(0.067)** (0.073) (0.046)** (0.043)
Aff Dec, year+1 -1.130 -1.134 0.391 0.356
(0.181)** (0.200)** (0.155)* (0.144)*
Aff Dec, year+2 -0.934 -0.910 0.650 0.615
(0.216)** (0.319)** (0.187)** (0.226)**
Aff Dec, year+3 -0.921 -1.061 0.853 0.816
(0.263)** (0.428)* (0.226)** (0.304)**
Neg Dec, year+1 -0.486 -0.376 0.265 0.157
(0.183)** (0.203) (0.163) (0.154)
Neg Dec, year+2 -0.452 -0.282 0.123 0.112
(0.215)* (0.315) (0.195) (0.239)
Neg Dec, year+3 -0.435 -0.448 0.553 0.674
(0.259) (0.425) (0.235)* (0.324)*
Settled, year+1 -0.628 -1.100 0.147 0.027
(0.237)** (0.280)** (0.210) (0.208)
Settled, year+2 -0.543 -1.030 0.282 0.186
(0.265)* (0.406)* (0.241) (0.313)
Settled, year+3 -1.068 -1.774 -0.111 -0.154
(0.317)** (0.539)** (0.276) (0.407)
Observations 3167 3167 2501 2501 1535 1535 1235 1235
R-squared 0.75 0.75 --- --- 0.91 0.91 --- ---
%∆  in dependent variable per unit change in
Aff Dec, year+1 -68.23% -68.45% 46.02% 41.32%
Aff Dec, year+2 -61.60% -61.73% 88.16% 80.27%
Aff Dec, year+3 -61.53% -68.41% 128.73% 116.01%
Neg Dec, year+1 -39.52% -32.73% 28.58% 15.58%
Neg Dec, year+2 -37.84% -28.23% 10.92% 8.73%
Neg Dec, year+3 -37.41% -41.65% 69.12% 86.14%
Settled, year+1 -48.13% -68.00% 13.31% 0.58%
Settled, year+2 -43.89% -67.13% 28.71% 14.74%
Settled, year+3 -67.33% -85.33% -13.89% -21.09%
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year dummies not reported
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% levelTable 5
Impact of AD Actions on Unit Value of Imports
Named Non-Named
ln Unit Value (FE) ln Unit Value (FE) ln Unit Value (IV) ln Unit Value (IV) ln Unit Value (FE) ln Unit Value (FE) ln Unit Value (IV) ln Unit Value (IV)
ln Unit Value, t-1 -0.018 -0.018 0.014 0.008 -0.039 -0.046 -0.076 -0.060
(0.021) (0.021) (0.056) (0.056) (0.028) (0.028) (0.076) (0.073)
ln Duty, year+1 0.059 0.051 0.025 0.030
(0.020)** (0.023)* (0.031) (0.035)
ln Duty, year+2 0.044 -0.020 -0.018 -0.046
(0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.038)
ln Duty, year+3 0.094 0.053 -0.012 0.002
(0.028)** (0.029) (0.040) (0.041)
Aff Dec, year+1 0.297 0.254 -0.015 0.069
(0.075)** (0.080)** (0.132) (0.137)
Aff Dec, year+2 0.250 0.234 -0.260 -0.197
(0.090)** (0.126) (0.159) (0.212)
Aff Dec, year+3 0.398 0.435 -0.289 -0.238
(0.109)** (0.170)* (0.192) (0.288)
Neg Dec, year+1 -0.007 0.013 -0.163 -0.158
(0.076) (0.081) (0.139) (0.148)
Neg Dec, year+2 0.095 0.152 -0.094 -0.102
(0.089) (0.126) (0.166) (0.228)
Neg Dec, year+3 0.176 0.331 -0.403 -0.325
(0.108) (0.170) (0.196)* (0.299)
Settled, year+1 0.078 0.116 -0.298 -0.280
(0.098) (0.111) (0.180) (0.198)
Settled, year+2 0.065 0.144 -0.193 -0.155
(0.110) (0.162) (0.206) (0.297)
Settled, year+3 0.186 0.286 -0.415 -0.374
(0.132) (0.215) (0.233) (0.381)
Observations 3167 3167 2501 2501 1535 1535 1235 1235
R-squared 0.89 0.89 --- --- 0.90 0.90 --- ---
%∆  in dependent variable per unit change in
Aff Dec, year+1 34.24% 28.54% -2.37% 6.15%
Aff Dec, year+2 27.93% 25.34% -23.84% -19.72%
Aff Dec, year+3 48.05% 52.26% -26.49% -24.43%
Neg Dec, year+1 -1.00% 1.01% -15.86% -15.55%
Neg Dec, year+2 9.51% 15.46% -10.23% -11.97%
Neg Dec, year+3 18.53% 37.31% -34.47% -30.90%
Settled, year+1 7.64% 11.58% -26.96% -25.89%
Settled, year+2 6.05% 14.02% -19.28% -18.06%
Settled, year+3 19.40% 30.10% -35.74% -36.01%
Standard errors in parentheses; constant and year dummies not reported
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level